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Multi-Party Privacy-Preserving Record Linkage
using Bloom Filters
Dinusha Vatsalan and Peter Christen
Abstract—Privacy-preserving record linkage (PPRL), the problem of identifying records that correspond to the same real-world entity
across several data sources held by different parties without revealing any sensitive information about these records, is increasingly
being required in many real-world application areas. Examples range from public health surveillance to crime and fraud detection, and
national security. Various techniques have been developed to tackle the problem of PPRL, with the majority of them considering linking
data from only two sources. However, in many real-world applications data from more than two sources need to be linked. In this paper
we propose a viable solution for multi-party PPRL using two efficient privacy techniques: Bloom filter encoding and distributed secure
summation. Our proposed protocol efficiently identifies matching sets of records held by all data sources that have a similarity above a
certain minimum threshold. While being efficient, our protocol is also secure under the semi-honest adversary model in that no party
can learn any sensitive information about any other parties’ data, but all parties learn which of their records have a high similarity with
records held by the other parties. We evaluate our protocol on a large real voter registration database showing the scalability, linkage
quality, and privacy of our approach.
Index Terms—Record linkage, privacy, Bloom filters, secure summation, multi-party, approximate matching.
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
Many organizations collect and process datasets that
contain many millions of records to analyze and mine
interesting patterns and knowledge in order to support
efficient and quality decision making [2]. Analyzing and
mining such large datasets often require data from multiple
sources to be aggregated. Linking records from different
data sources with the aim to improve data quality or enrich
data for further analysis is occurring in an increasing num-
ber of application areas, such as in healthcare, government
services, crime and fraud detection, national security, and
business applications [3], [4]. The analysis of data linked
across organizations can, for example, facilitate the detection
of an outbreak of an infectious disease early before it spreads
widely around a country or even worldwide, or enable
the accurate identification of fraud, crime, or terrorism
suspects [5]. The health outbreak system described above
requires data from several organizations, such as human
health data, travel data, consumed drug data, and even
animal health data [6]. The second above example of fraud
and crime detection requires data from law enforcement
agencies, Internet service providers, businesses, as well as
financial institutions [7].
Today, record linkage not only faces computational chal-
lenges due to the increasing size of datasets, and quality
challenges due to the presence of real-world data errors, but
also the challenge of preserving privacy and confidentiality
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due to growing privacy concerns by the public [5], [6]. In
the absence of unique entity identifiers in the databases that
are linked, personal identifying attributes (such as names,
addresses, gender, and dates of birth) are often used for
the linkage. Known as quasi-identifiers (QIDs) [8], values
in such attributes are in general sufficiently well correlated
with the corresponding real-world entities to allow accurate
linkage. Using such personal information across different
organizations, however, often leads to privacy and confi-
dentiality concerns.
The privacy challenges posed in the record linkage pro-
cess has led to the development of techniques that facili-
tate ‘privacy-preserving record linkage’ (PPRL) [5]. PPRL
tackles the problem of how to identify records that refer to
the same entity in different databases across organizations
using the masked QIDs that are revealed. Generally, the
original QID values are transformed (masked) such that a
specific functional relationship exists between the original
and the masked values [9], and linkage is conducted using
those masked QIDs without privacy and confidentiality of
the entities represented by the records being compromised.
A viable PPRL solution that can be used in real-world
applications needs to address all three challenges (or proper-
ties) of PPRL: scalability (which is dependent on the compu-
tation and communication complexity of a protocol), linkage
quality (dependent on data quality and the comparison
functions and classifiers used), and privacy (dependent on
the privacy techniques employed). While there have been
many different approaches proposed for PPRL [5], most
work in this research area thus far has concentrated on
linking records from only two sources (or parties). As the
example applications described above have shown, linking
data from several sources is however commonly required.
The pipeline of PPRL for multiple databases is shown
in Fig. 1. PPRL on multiple databases introduces addi-
tional challenges with respect to scalability (complexity),
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Fig. 1. A general privacy-preserving record linkage pipeline for multiple (P ) databases. Databases are partitioned in step 1 to reduce the number of
candidate sets such that only records in the same blocks or partitions are compared and classified in step 2. Everything represented with a dotted
outline needs to be conducted such that privacy is preserved.
linkage quality, and privacy [10]. Complexity increases sig-
nificantly with multiple parties in terms of both computa-
tional efforts and communication size. The number of all-
to-all comparisons required between P different databases
(D1,D2, · · · ,DP ) is equal to the product of the size of
these databases (i.e. |D1| × |D2| · · · × |DP |). As shown in
Fig. 1, the quadratic or exponential complexity (for linking
two databases or multiple databases, respectively) has been
addressed by using two-step algorithms where in the first
step a private blocking approach is used in order to reduce
the number of candidate record sets, that will then be
compared and classified in the second step using private
comparison and classification functions [5]. However, in
multi-party PPRL the total number of candidate record sets
increases exponentially with the number of parties, and thus
even using existing private blocking techniques would not
sufficiently reduce the number of comparisons. Efficient and
advanced blocking and filtering approaches for multi-party
PPRL need to be used in order to reduce this potentially
huge number of comparisons. Computations should also
be distributed among the different parties to reduce the
computational efforts at each individual party.
The risk of privacy breaches also increases with mul-
tiple parties due to possible collusion between a sub-set
of parties with the aim to learn about another (sub-set of)
party’s private data. All computations should be distributed
among the parties in such a way that each party can learn
only a limited amount of information of other parties’
data that cannot be used to infer the represented entities.
Employing computationally expensive privacy techniques
such as Secure Multi-party Computation (SMC) [11], [12]
provides strong privacy guarantees at the cost of increased
computational and communication complexities with the
increasing size of datasets and the increasing number of
parties, making SMC solutions not scalable and practical in
real applications.
With regard to quality, private comparison and classifica-
tion on multiple databases is another challenging aspect due
to the need of calculating the similarity of multiple values.
How to efficiently calculate the similarity of more than
two values using approximate comparison functions [3] in
PPRL is an important research question that needs to be
addressed. Existing PPRL solutions for multiple parties only
support exact matching (which classifies sets of records as
matches if their masked QIDs are exactly the same and as
non-matches if they differ) [13], [14], or they are applicable
to QIDs of categorical data type only (while in most PPRL
applications QIDs of string data type, such as names and
addresses, are commonly required) [15], [16].
Despite these challenges, PPRL on multiple databases
is required in many real-world applications (as described
above). A recent work by Ranbaduge et al. [17] aimed to
reduce the number of candidate record sets that need to be
compared by using a multi-party private blocking approach.
In this paper, we focus on the private comparison and clas-
sification step in the PPRL pipeline for multiple databases
(step 2 in Fig. 1) and propose a solution that performs
efficient (distributed) and approximate matching of string
values using computation and space efficient privacy tech-
niques: Bloom filters and distributed secure summation. We
also include a filtering approach into our protocol that can
be used to considerably reduce the number of comparisons
(in addition to a private blocking approach).
The main contributions of this paper are: (1) an efficient
multi-party protocol for private comparison and classifica-
tion in PPRL; (2) a filtering approach on candidate sets of
records that are likely to correspond to non-matches; (3)
an analysis of the protocol in terms of the three properties,
scalability (complexity), linkage quality, and privacy; and
(4) an empirical evaluation and comparison of our protocol
with a baseline multi-party approach [13] in terms of the
three properties of PPRL using the large North Carolina
Voter Registration (NCVR) [18] datasets.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In
the following section we review related work in multi-party
PPRL. In Section 3 we describe the steps of our multi-party
protocol for efficient and approximate private comparison
and classification in PPRL. We analyze our solution in terms
of complexity, linkage quality, and privacy in Section 4,
and in Section 5 we conduct an empirical study on the
large real NCVR datasets to validate these analyses. Finally,
we summarize and discuss future research directions in
Section 6.
2 RELATED WORK
Various techniques have been developed to address the
PPRL research problem [5], but few among these have
considered PPRL on multiple databases. An early approach
to PPRL [14] links multiple databases by comparing the
hash-encoded (using one-way secure hash algorithms) QID
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Fig. 2. Distributed exact matching of QIDs in multi-party PPRL (P = 3)
as proposed by Lai et al. [13] (adopted from [5]). Different colors repre-
sent the Bloom filters held by different parties and bit segments of Bloom
filters processed by different parties. Bits 1, 4, and 8 are set to 1 in the
final result and therefore QID value ‘peter’ is a matching value.
values from all data sources by using a third party. However,
this approach only performs exact matching (i.e. a single
variation in a QID value results in a completely different
hash-encoded value).
An SMC-based approach using an oblivious transfer
protocol was presented by O’Keefe et al. [19] for PPRL on
multiple databases. The approach improves on the security
and information leakage characteristics of several previous
protocols, including Agrawal et al.’s [20] two-party secure
intersection and equi-join protocols that use commutative
encryption schemes. While provably secure, the approach
only performs exact matching of masked values (i.e. vari-
ations and errors in the QID values are not considered).
The approach is also computationally expensive compared
to perturbation-based privacy techniques [5].
A multi-party approach based on the k-anonymity and
secure equi-join privacy techniques was introduced by
Kantarcioglu et al. [15]. The database owners individually
k-anonymize their databases and send the anonymized
databases to a third party that constructs buckets corre-
sponding to each combination of k-anonymous values. For
each bucket, the third party performs a secure equi-join. This
approach is only applicable to categorical data.
Recently, a multi-party PPRL approach for approximate
matching of categorical values based on k-anonymity was
proposed [16]. The database owners find the global winner
candidate attribute with the best score that provides the
least amount of information to the other parties according to
some criteria. Then they perform a top-down specialization
on that attribute for generalizing the databases. The well-
known C4.5 classifier is used to recursively block (general-
ize) and classify the records in the databases. Similar to [15],
this approach is only applicable to linking records using
attributes that contain categorical data.
An efficient multi-party PPRL approach for exact match-
ing using Bloom filters was introduced by Lai et al. [13].
Fig. 2 illustrates this approach for P = 3 example databases.
The database values (QIDs) are first converted into one
Bloom filter bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ P per party. Each party then parti-
tions its Bloom filter into segments according to the number
of parties involved in the linkage, and sends these segments
to the corresponding other parties. The segments received
by a party are combined using a conjunction (logical AND)
operation. The final conjuncted Bloom filter segments are
then exchanged among the parties. Each party compares its
Bloom filter of each QID value with the final result, and if
the membership test of a QID value is successful then it is
considered to be amatch. Though the cost of this approach is
low since the computation is completely distributed among
the parties and the creation and processing of Bloom filters
are very fast (linear complexity in the size of the database),
the approach can only perform exact matching.
Since existing private comparison and classification solu-
tions for multi-party PPRL either (1) support exact matching
only (which is not applicable in most real-world applica-
tions due to the common occurrences of data errors and
variations [21]), (2) employ expensive privacy techniques such
as SMC, or (3) they are only applicable to categorical data,
we aim to overcome these three problems by proposing a
multi-party approximate string matching protocol for PPRL
using efficient privacy techniques. As we describe in the next
section, we use Lai et al.’s [13] multi-party Bloom filter based
exact matching approach (described above) as one building
block for our approximate matching solution.
3 MULTI-PARTY LINKAGE PROTOCOL
We now describe our approach to efficiently and approxi-
mately link databases from three or more parties. We use
the following notation: P is the number of parties involved
in our protocol, where each party pi holds a database Di
containing sensitive or confidential identifying information.
Database Di contains Ni = |Di| records. We assume a set
of QID attributes A, which will be used for the linkage, is
common to all these databases. Our protocol will calculate
the similarity between sets of records using the values in A.
In the following sub-section we describe the building blocks
of our protocol, then in Section 3.2 we explain the steps
of our protocol in detail, and in Section 3.3 we propose a
filtering approach to improve the efficiency of our protocol.
3.1 Protocol Building Blocks
1. Bloom filter encoding: A Bloom filter bi is a bit array data
structure of length l bits where all bits are initially set to 0. k
independent hash functions, h1, h2, . . . , hk, each with range
1, . . . l, are used to map each of the elements in a set S into
the Bloom filter by setting k corresponding bit positions to
1. Bloom filters are one efficient perturbation-based privacy
technique that has successfully been used in several PPRL
solutions [22], [23], [24].
Schnell et al. [22] were the first to propose a method
for approximate matching in PPRL of two databases using
Bloom filters. In their work, as in our protocol, the character
q-grams (sub-strings of length q) of QID values in A of each
record in the databases to be linked are hash-mapped into
a Bloom filter using k independent hash functions. These
Bloom filters are then sent to a third party that calculates
the Dice coefficient [3] similarity of pairs of Bloom filters.
Bloom filters can be susceptible to frequency attacks [25]
depending on the values of the parameters k, l, and q.
Hence, these Bloom filter parameters need to be set carefully
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Dice coefficient similarity (adapted from [5]).
as the values provide a trade-off between privacy and link-
age quality (as will be discussed in Section 4). Several Bloom
filter encoding methods [23], [26], [27] have been proposed
to improve privacy by reducing the risk of such frequency
attacks while not compromising the linkage quality.
Schnell et al. [26] proposed to hash-map several QID
attribute values of a record into one Bloom filter, known
as Cryptographic Long term Key (CLK) encoding. Durham
et al. [23] investigated composite Bloom filters (record-level
Bloom filters) in detail by first hash-mapping different at-
tributes into attribute-level Bloom filters of different lengths
(depending on the weights [28] of QID attributes that cal-
culate the discriminatory power in resolving identity using
a statistical approach) and then combining these attribute-
level Bloom filters into one record-level Bloom filter (known
as RBF) by sampling bits from each attribute-level Bloom fil-
ter. Vatsalan et al. [27] recently introduced a hybrid method
of CLK and RBF (known as CLKRBF) where the Bloom filter
length is kept to be the same as in CLK while using different
number of hash functions to map different attributes into the
Bloom filter based on their weights as used in RBF.
2. Dice coefficient: Any set-based similarity function can
be used to calculate the similarity of pairs or sets of Bloom
filters. The Dice coefficient has previously been used for
matching of Bloom filters in PPRL since it is insensitive
to many matching zeros in long Bloom filters [22]. The
Dice coefficient similarity of two Bloom filters (b1, b2) is
calculated as [3]:
Dice sim(b1, b2) =
2× c
x1 + x2
(1)
where c is the number of common bit positions that are set
to 1 in both Bloom filters b1 and b2 (common 1-bits), x1 is the
number of bit positions that are set to 1 in b1, and x2 is the
number of bit positions that are set to 1 in b2. For example,
mapping the bigrams (q = 2) of two string values ‘peter’
and ‘pete’ into l = 14 bits long Bloom filters using k = 2
hash functions and calculating the Dice coefficient similarity
of these two Bloom filters are illustrated in Fig. 3.
We define the Dice coefficient similarity of P (P ≥ 2)
Bloom filters (b1, · · · , bP ) as:
Dice sim(b1, · · · , bP ) =
P × c∑P
i=1 xi
(2)
where c is the number of common bit positions that are set
to 1 in all P Bloom filters (common 1-bits), and xi is the
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Fig. 4. Dice coefficient similarity calculation of three Bloom filters (BFs)
across three parties (P = 3). Rows illustrate the BFs, bi, generated
by the three parties, pi, with 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, while columns show which
party holds which BF segments. Different colors represent the BFs held
by different parties and the bit segments of BFs processed by different
parties (adapted from [1]).
number of bit positions set to 1 in bi (1-bits), 1 ≤ i ≤ P .
3. Multi-party Bloom filter matching: In our protocol the
calculation of the number of common 1-bits (c) is distributed
among the parties, such that c =
∑P
i=1 ci.
Dice sim(b1, · · · , bP ) =
P ×
∑P
i=1 ci∑P
i=1 xi
(3)
Following Lai et al.’s approach [13], Bloom filters are split
into P segments and each party sends its segments to the
corresponding other parties. Each party then individually
calculates the number of common 1-bits ci in its respective
segment of the Bloom filters it receives from the other parties
for all sets of records. As an example, the distributed Dice
coefficient calculation of a set of three Bloom filters from
three parties is shown in Fig. 4.
4. Secure summation: Once each of the P parties has
calculated its ci and xi values for each set of Bloom filters,
the summations of values c =
∑P
i=1 ci and x =
∑P
i=1 xi
need to be calculated in a secure way in order to calculate
the Dice coefficient similarity of the set of Bloom filters.
A secure summation protocol [29], which has been used
as an efficient tool for privacy-preserving data mining [6],
can be efficiently employed for this purpose. This protocol
uses a random number r (any integer number) to hide the
actual sensitive values ci and xi, and employs a ring-based
communication pattern over all parties which allows each
party to learn the final values c and x, but no party will learn
the individual values (i.e. ci and xi) of the other parties. A
simple example illustrating the secure summation protocol
is shown in Fig. 5.
3.2 Protocol Steps
In this section we describe in detail the steps of our protocol
to approximately and privately link databases from P (≥ 3)
sources/parties. We illustrate the steps using three example
datasets held by three parties, as shown in Fig. 6. In Fig. 7
to Fig. 9 we illustrate the steps of our protocol for the three
example datasets.
• Step 1: The parties agree upon the following pa-
rameter values: the Bloom filter length l such that
l mod P = 0 to allow splitting of Bloom filters
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Fig. 6. Example Bloom filters held by three parties p1, p2, and p3, and the number of 1-bits (x1, x2, and x3, respectively) in each of their Bloom
filters along with the RIDs stored in D1, D2, and D3 respectively, and the BKVs, used to illustrate the steps of the protocol described in Section 3.2.
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such that each party pi receives the ith Bloom filter segments from all other parties. This figure illustrates Step 4 of the protocol.
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b = 7, and c = 15) using a random value r = 20 in a ring-based
communication pattern between three different parties (p1, p2, and p3,
respectively). Four communication phases are involved in the secure
summation of three values.
into segments of same size; the k hashing functions
h1, . . . , hk to be used; the length (in characters) of
grams q; a minimum Dice similarity threshold value,
st, above which a set of records is classified as
a match; a private blocking function block(·); the
blocking keys [3] B used for blocking; and a set of
QID attributes A used for the linkage.
The setting of Bloom filter parameters and the en-
coding method is crucial to determine the privacy
of our protocol. We propose to perform a simulation
attack [24] by the database owners on their own sets
of Bloom filters in terms of the sensitivity of each bit
in the Bloom filters before agreeing on the parameter
setting, as will be discussed in detail in Section 4.2.
• Step 2: Each party pi (1 ≤ i ≤ P ) individually
applies a private blocking function [5] block(·) (step 1
in Fig. 1) to reduce the number of candidate sets of
records (from
∏P
i Ni). It is important to use a block-
ing function as the total number of sets of records
from P databases quickly becomes prohibitive even
for moderate P orN . block(·) groups records accord-
ing to the blocking key values (BKVs) [30] and only
records with the same BKV (i.e. records in the same
block) from different parties are then compared and
classified (step 2 in Fig. 1) using our protocol.
In the running example we consider the five records
with record identifiers (RIDs) RA1, RA2, RB1,
RB2, and RC1 in the three databases which we
assume are blocked into the same block (i.e. have
the same BKV - ‘bk1’, while record RC2 having a
different BKV - ‘bk2’), so that there exist the fol-
lowing four candidate sets of (three) records from
the three parties (excluding sets of records from the
same party): (RA1, RB1, RC1), (RA1, RB2, RC1),
(RA2, RB1, RC1), and (RA2, RB2, RC1) for com-
parison and classification.
• Step 3: Each party pi hash-maps the q-gram values
of A of each of its Ni records in their respective
databases Di into Ni Bloom filters of length l using
the hash functions h1, . . . , hk. It is crucial to set the
Bloom filter related parameters in an optimal way
that balances all three properties of PPRL (complex-
ity, quality, and privacy). We further discuss the pa-
rameter setting for Bloom filters used in our protocol
in Section 4. For all records and their Bloom filters,
each party pi calculates the total number of 1-bits in
the Bloom filters (xi) and stores these values along
with RIDs and BKVs, as shown in Fig. 6.
• Step 4: Each party pi segments its Bloom filters into
P equal sized segments of length l/P bits and sends
the jth segment of each of its Bloom filters along with
the (encrypted) RIDs and BKVs to party pj , with 1 ≤
j ≤ P and j 6= i. This step is illustrated for the three
example datasets in Fig. 7.
• Step 5: Each party pi receives the i
th segment of
Bloom filters from all other parties pj , with 1 ≤
i, j ≤ P and j 6= i. For each set of Bloom filters
(b1, b2, · · · , bP ) of the records from all parties that
are in the same block, party pi applies a logical
conjunction (AND) on the Bloom filter segments
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Fig. 8. The calculation of values for ci and xi individually by each party pi for all the candidate sets of records from all three parties. Different colors
represent the Bloom filter segments received from different parties. This figure illustrates Step 5 of the protocol.
Algo. 1: Distributed calculation of common 1-bits (ci) by pi.
Input:
- my segs: List of record IDs, their BKVs, ith Bloom filter
segments, and total number of 1-bits (xi) in the Bloom
filters held by party pi
- other segs: Lists of record IDs, their BKVs, and ith Bloom
filter segments of other parties pj , 1 ≤ j ≤ P and j 6= i
- common blocks: List of BKVs common in all P databases
Output:
- Ci: Candidate record sets with their ci and xi values
1: Ci = [ ]
2: for bkv ∈ common blocks do:
3: candidate sets = my segs.get RIDs(bkv)
4: for 1 ≤ j ≤ P and j 6= i do:
5: pj records = other segs.get RIDs(bkv)
6: for rec comb ∈ candidate sets do:
7: for rec ∈ pj records do:
8: rec comb.append(rec)
9: for cand ∈ candidate sets do:
10: xi = my segs.get xi(cand[i])
11: bf seg = my segs.get seg(cand[i])
12: for 1 ≤ j ≤ P and j 6= i do:
13: bf seg & = other segs.get seg(cand[j])
14: ci = bf seg.count 1bits()
15: Ci.append([cand, ci, xi])
(bi1 ∧ b
i
2 ∧ · · · ∧ b
i
P ). This results in the common
bit pattern for segment i from all parties which
allows party pi to calculate the number of common
1-bits (ci) in the i
th segment. Fig. 8 illustrates this
distributed calculation of ci values for the running
example candidate sets (in block ‘bk1’).
The distributed common 1-bits calculation (ci, 1 ≤
i ≤ P ) is described in Algo. 1 for one party pi (this
algorithm is executed by each party individually).
The party first generates the candidate sets of records
candidate sets in lines 1-8. For each candidate set
cand in candidate sets the ith segments from all
parties are conjuncted (&) in lines 11-13 to generate
the bit pattern of that segment that contains only
the common 1-bits. The number of common 1-bits
in the ith segment (ci) is calculated in line 14 for each
candidate set by using a count 1bits() function and
Algo. 2: Secure summation of ci and xi values.
Input:
- Ci: Candidate record sets of party pi with ci and xi
values, 1 ≤ i ≤ P
- Rc and Rx: Lists of random values used by party p1 for
secure summation of ci and xi values, respectively
Output:
- C′: Candidate record sets with summed values of ci and xi
1: C′ = [ ]
2: for 1 ≤ i ≤ P do:
3: if i == 1 then:
4: for cand ∈ C1 do:
5: ci = Rc[cand] +C1.get ci(cand)
6: xi = Rx[cand] +C1.get xi(cand)
7: C′.append([cand, ci, xi])
8: C′.send to(p2)
9: else:
10: C′.receive from(pi−1)
11: for cand ∈ C′ do:
12: C′.get ci(cand) += Ci.get ci(cand)
13: C′.get xi(cand) += Ci.get xi(cand)
14: if i 6= P then:
15: C′.send to(pi+1)
16: else:
17: C′.send to(p1)
stored in Ci along with the number of 1-bits in the
full Bloom filter of party pi’s record in the set (xi,
which is calculated in line 10), and the list of all RIDs
(cand) in the set.
• Step 6: Once the common 1-bits in each segment
ci are calculated by each respective party pi, a ring-
based communication pattern is used among the
parties to securely calculate the summation of the
ci and xi values, c =
∑P
i=1 ci and x =
∑P
i=1 xi,
respectively, for each candidate set using the secure
summation protocol, as illustrated in Fig. 9 for the
running example.
Algo. 2 provides an overview of the secure sum-
mation of common and total 1-bits (
∑P
i=1 ci and∑P
i=1 xi) for each candidate set. The party that ini-
tiated the communication (we assume the first party,
p1) adds two random valuesRc[cand] andRx[cand]
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Fig. 9. The secure summation of the ci and xi values to calculate c =
∑P
i=1
ci and x =
∑P
i=1
xi, respectively, for each candidate set of records,
in order to calculate the Dice coefficient similarity of those record sets. The lists of random values used by party p1 for the secure summation of the
ci and xi values are Rc = [7, 12, 9, 15] and Rx = [20, 13, 10, 5], respectively. This figure illustrates Step 6 of the protocol.
Algo. 3: Similarity calculation of record sets (by p1).
Input:
- C′: Candidate record sets with summed values of ci and xi
from party pP
- Rc and Rx: Lists of random values used by party p1 for
secure summation of ci and xi values, respectively
- st: Minimum similarity threshold to classify record sets
Output:
- M: List of matching record sets
1: M = [ ]
2: C′.receive from(pP )
3: for cand ∈ C′ do:
4: sum ci = C
′.get ci(cand)−Rc[cand]
5: sum xi = C
′.get xi(cand)−Rx[cand]
6: Dice sim(cand) = P×sum ci
sum xi
7: if Dice sim(cand) ≥ st then:
8: M.append([cand,Dice sim(cand)])
9. for 2 ≤ j ≤ P do:
10: M.send to(pj)
with its values for ci and xi (i = 1), respectively,
for each candidate set cand, and sends the summed
valuesRc[cand]+ci andRx[cand]+xi to party pi+1
(i.e. p2) in lines 3-8. Party pi, 1 < i ≤ P receives
the summed values from pi−1 and adds its values
for ci and xi for each candidate set and sends the
summed values to the next party pi+1. This process
is repeated until the last party (i.e. pP ) sums its cP
and xP values with the received summed values
Rc[cand] +
∑P−1
i=1 ci and Rx[cand] +
∑P−1
i=1 xi from
party pP−1, respectively, and sends the final summed
values to p1 (as explained in lines 9-17 in Algo. 2).
• Step 7: Finally, the first party, p1, that initiated
the communication subtractsRc[cand] andRx[cand]
from the received final summed values Rc[cand] +∑P
i=1 ci and Rx[cand] +
∑P
i=1 xi, respectively, for
each candidate set cand from the last party pP . This
is outlined in Algo. 3 (lines 2-5) and illustrated in
Fig. 10 for the running example. As shown in lines 6-
8, p1 then calculates the Dice coefficient similarity of
each set of Bloom filters using
∑P
i=1 ci and
∑P
i=1 xi
following Equation 3 to classify the compared sets
of records within a block into matches and non-
matches based on the similarity threshold st. The
final similarities of matching sets of records are sent
to all the other parties pj , with 2 ≤ j ≤ P in lines 9-
10 in Algo. 3 (right side of Fig. 10).
3.3 Filtering Candidate Record Sets
The most challenging aspect of multi-party PPRL is that the
number of candidate record sets can become prohibitively
very large even with a blocking technique employed. This
imposes the need for using advanced blocking and filtering
approaches in order to make multi-party PPRL scalable and
practical in real applications with large datasets. In this
section, we describe a filtering approach that can be used in
our private comparison and classification protocol to further
reduce the number of candidate record sets resulting from
the blocking step in the PPRL pipeline.
Filtering techniques are commonly employed in similar-
ity calculations, such as length, position and prefix filtering
in PPJoin [31]. Recent work in converting such techniques
into a privacy-preserving framework [32] highlighted the
difficulty of applying such traditional filtering techniques
on Bloom filters. In order to achieve high linkage quality
and preserve privacy, as will be discussed in Section 4, the
Bloom filters used in PPRL protocols should ideally have
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Fig. 10. The calculation of the Dice coefficient similarity of candidate record sets using Equation 3 and the classification of sets of records into
matches and non-matches. The minimum similarity threshold is set to st = 0.8 in this example. We classified one matching set of records cand2 =
(RA1, RB2, RC1) across the three datasets. This figure illustrates Step 7 of the protocol.
half of their bits set to 1 (i.e. be half filled), making length,
position and prefix filtering ineffective.
In our protocol, we therefore investigate the following
filtering approach which exploits the fact that parties only
have access to a fraction of all Bloom filters. Our assump-
tion is that the positions of 1-bits in the Bloom filters
are uniformly distributed (due to the random behavior
of hash functions) across the Bloom filters [22], [33]. This
assumption of uniform distribution of 1-bits in the Bloom
filters means that the segments of Bloom filters of a set
of records (b1, · · · , bj) need to have a segment similar-
ity seg simi(b1, · · · , bj), with 1 ≤ i, j ≤ P , of at least
sm in order to achieve the overall Bloom filter similarity
Dice sim(b1, · · · , bj) ≥ st to be classified as a matching set.
When each party pi computes the number of common
1-bits, ci, in the i
th segments of each candidate set (Step 5
of the protocol as described in Section 3.2), the party can
calculate its seg simi(b1, · · · , bP ) as it knows the i
th Bloom
filter segments of all P records from the P parties in a
set. If the seg simi(b1, · · · , bj) < sm for any sub-set of j
(j < P ) records in the set of P records, then the comparison
and calculation of ci can be stopped without proceeding to
compare any other sub-sets of records from the remaining
P − j parties with the sub-set of records of (b1, · · · , bj). This
basically expands lines 9-15 of Algo. 1 as shown in Algo. 4
for party pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ P .
Lines 15 to 19 show the extension of Algo. 1 for the
filtering approach. Party pi iterates over the i
th segments
of the other parties pj (1 ≤ j ≤ P , j 6= i) in line 13.
The number of common 1-bits and the total number of
1-bits in the ith segments of j parties are calculated in
lines 14-16, which are then used to calculate the segment
similarity of j segments seg simi(b1, · · · , bj) in line 17. If
seg simi(b1, · · · , bj) < sm (line 18), then the comparison
Algo. 4: Filtering candidate sets by pi (extended Algo. 1).
9: for cand ∈ candidate sets do:
10: xi = my segs.get xi(cand[i])
11: bf seg = my segs.get seg(cand[i])
12: seg xi = bf seg.count 1bits()
13: for 1 ≤ j ≤ P and j 6= i do:
14: bf seg & = other segs.get seg(cand[j])
15: seg ci = bf seg.count 1bits()
16: seg xi += other segs.get seg(cand[j]).count 1bits()
17: seg simi(b1, · · · , bj) = j × seg ci/seg xi
18: if seg simi(b1, · · · , bj) < sm then:
19: break
20: ci = bf seg.count 1bits()
21: Ci.append([cand, ci, xi])
of remaining segments (bj+1, · · · , bP ) with these segments
and the calculation of ci and xi can be stopped without
proceeding further, as they are with high likelihood non-
matching sets.
Assuming uniform distribution of bits in the Bloom
filters, sm can be set to the same as st so that each segment
contributes the same to the overall Bloom filter similarity
st. An alternative is to set sm to a value smaller than st
to incorporate the trade-off between the number of false
negatives (due to random hash-mapping of q-grams) and
the number of resulting candidate sets.
As an example of filtering, assume three databases D1,
D2, and D3 with records (RA1, RA2) from D1, (RB1,
RB2) fromD2, and (RC1, RC2, RC3) fromD3 in the same
block (resulting from a private blocking function) need to be
compared in order to identify the matching sets of records
from all three databases. This requires private comparison of
12 sets of Bloom filter segments from the three databases by
each party. If the ith Bloom filter segments for records RA1
9andRB2 do not have a similarity of at least sm as calculated
by party pi, then the comparisons of RA1 and RB2 with
RC1, RC2 and RC3 are not required, which reduces the
number of comparisons for a block by party pi from 12 to
9. This reduction is significant when the number of parties
increases (as will be empirically shown in Section 5).
4 ANALYSIS OF THE PROTOCOL
In this section we analyze our multi-party PPRL protocol in
terms of complexity, privacy, and linkage quality.
4.1 Complexity Analysis
We assume P parties participate in the protocol, each having
a database of N records, and we assume a private block-
ing/indexing technique employed in the private blocking
step forms B ≤ N blocks for each party. In Step 1 of
our protocol, the agreement of parameters has a constant
communication complexity, and blocking the databases in
protocol Step 2 has O(N) computation complexity at each
party. Finding the intersection of blocks from all parties has
a communication complexity of O(P B) and a computation
complexity of O(B log B) at each party. Assuming the
average number of q-grams in the QID attributes A of each
record isQ, the masking of QID values of records into Bloom
filters of length l using k hash functions for N records in
Step 3 is O(N Q k) at each party.
In Step 4, each party sends its Bloom filter segments
(each of length l/P ) to the other parties. If we assume direct
communication between parties, then P (P − 1) messages
are required in this step, each of these of size N × l/P
(thus O(N l P ) total communication). With the simplified
assumption that all blocks are of equal size (N/B), then in
each block (N/B)P sets of Bloom filters (i.e. all candidate
sets of records in a block) have to be generated and their
logical conjunctions calculated in Step 5, leading to a total
of O(B(N/B)P ) calculations by each party.
Filtering reduces the number of comparisons from
(N/B)P to (N/B − F )P , where F is the number of Bloom
filter segments filtered from each party in each block. Fil-
tering more non-matching record sets by increasing F will
improve the efficiency of our protocol.
Steps 6 and 7 consist of the secure summation of the
calculated number of common 1-bits (ci) and total 1-bits
(xi) in order to calculate the similarity of candidate sets.
This requires for each candidate set of Bloom filters two
integer numbers to be sent in a ring communication (P
messages) over all parties with a total communication of
O(P B(N/B − F )P ), followed by the distribution of the
final results which is again O(P B(N/B − F )P ).
4.2 Privacy Analysis
To assess the privacy of our protocol, we assume all parties
follow the honest-but-curious adversary model [5], in that
they are curious and try to find out as much as possible
about the other parties’ data while following the protocol.
In order to analyze the privacy of our solution, we discuss
what the parties can learn from the data exchanged among
them during the protocol. There are two communication
steps in our protocol where the parties reveal some infor-
mation regarding their data.
In Step 4 of our protocol, the parties split and exchange
their Bloom filter segments (of l/P length) to the corre-
sponding other parties to calculate the common 1-bits in
the segments. Since calculations are distributed among the
parties, each party only learns l/P bits of each of the other
parties’ Bloom filters, which will make it difficult to exploit
a cryptanalysis attack [25]. This is the highest amount of
information a party can learn about data of other parties
in our protocol. It is important to note that this amount of
information (1/P fraction of bits) that can be learned by a
party about another party’s Bloom filters reduces (and thus
privacy improves) with increasing P .
The values for the number of hash functions used (k) and
the length of the Bloom filter (l) provide a trade-off between
the linkage quality and privacy [22], as will be discussed
in detail in the next sub-section. The higher the value
for k/l, the higher the privacy and the lower the quality
of linkage, because the number of q-grams mapped to a
single bit (and therefore the number of resulting collisions)
increases, which leads to lower linkage quality but makes
it more difficult for an adversary to learn the possible q-
gram combinations [25]. The CLK Bloom filter encoding
method (as discussed in Section 3.1) of hash-mapping sev-
eral QID values from each record into one compound Bloom
filter [24], [26] makes it even more difficult for an adversary
to learn individual QID values that correspond to a revealed
bit pattern in a Bloom filter.
In addition, the parties can individually mount a sim-
ulation attack on their own masked databases in the data
masking and preparation step (Step 1 of our protocol) to
learn the sensitivity of each bit in their Bloom filters, as
discussed in Section 3.2. Following Durham’s work [23], the
sensitivity of bit position βx, 1 ≤ x ≤ l in masked Bloom
filters of D, is referred as S(βx) and calculated as:
dist(βx) = |u| : ∀u ∈ U and hy(u) = βx, 1 ≤ y ≤ k,
freq(βx) = |r| : ∀r ∈ D and r.βx = 1,
S(βx) = 1/min {dist(βx), freq(βx)} , (4)
where U is a set of all unique q-grams in dataset D, r.βx
is the value (0 or 1) in bit position βx of r’s Bloom filter,
and hy , 1 ≤ y ≤ k, are the hash functions used to map q-
grams into Bloom filters. The distribution of q-grams in the
bits is represented by the dist(βx) function which calculates
the number of unique q-grams that are mapped to a certain
bit position βx, and the frequency of bits is calculated by
freq(βx) function that counts the number of records that set
the bit position βx to 1. The minimum of these two functions
is used to calculate the sensitivity of bit S(βx), since a bit
that maps to a larger number of q-grams is not secure (not
less sensitive) if all those q-grams correspond to the same
record. The higher the value for S(βx) is, the higher the
sensitivity of bit βx. Based on such a sensitivity analysis, the
parties can perturb their masked datasets, for example by
adding random noise [23], [24], to improve the privacy of
the masking at the cost of some loss in linkage quality.
The second communication step, where the secure sum-
mation protocol is used (Step 6), requires parties to send
their sums of ci and xi values (with the respective summed
10
values received from the previous party) for each candidate
set to the next party in a ring-based communication. During
this communication, however, no party pj can learn any
information regarding the individual values for ci and xi
of any other party pi (with 1 ≤ i ≤ P and i 6= j), except the
final results of
∑P
i=1 ci and
∑P
i=1 xi.
Party p1 who initiates the secure summation protocol
learns more information than the other parties in that it can
subtract the random values and its own values from the final
sums in order to learn
∑P
i=2 ci and
∑P
i=2 xi. Since these two
results are in the range of 0 ≤
∑P
i=2 ci ≤ (P − 1)l and
(P − 1)k ≤
∑P
i=2 xi ≤ (P − 1)l, respectively, it would be
difficult to infer the individual values of each party due to
the large number of combinations. The larger the number
of parties (P ) is, the larger the range and the number of
combinations, and thus the inference would be harder with
more parties. The only information that p1 can learn is that
if all the other segments have common 1-bits or not, i.e. if∑P
i=2 ci > 0 or not. However, with this information, it is
difficult to infer which bit positions are in common in the
other segments.
This process can also be distributed in such a way that
each party calculates the final sums (by initiating the secure
summation protocol) for a certain sub-set of all the candi-
date sets in order to improve the privacy of our protocol.
Another alternative approach is to use an external party to
perform the secure summationwhich can then send the final
summed values (and the similarities) to all the P parties.
4.3 Quality Analysis
Our protocol supports approximatematching of QID values,
in that data errors and variations are taken into account
depending on the minimum similarity threshold st used.
The quality of Bloom filter encoding based masking is de-
pendent on the Bloom filter parameterization [13], [22], [23],
[24]. For a given Bloom filter length, l, and the number of
elementsQ (e.g. q-grams) to be inserted into the Bloom filter,
the optimal number of hash functions, k, that minimizes the
false positive rate f (of a collision of two different q-grams
being mapped to the same bit position), is calculated as [34]:
k =
l
Q
ln(2), (5)
leading to a false positive rate of
f =
(
1
2ln(2)
)l/Q
. (6)
For a given l, we can calculate k based on the average
number of q-grams, Q, that are generated from a record,
as calculated from the datasets. While k and l determine
the computational aspects of our approach, linkage quality
and privacy will be determined by the false positive rate
f . A higher value for f will mean a larger number of false
matches and thus lower linkage quality. At the same time, a
higher false positive rate f will also mean improved privacy,
as false positives mean an adversary cannot be absolutely
sure that a certain bit pattern (or a Bloom filter segment)
corresponds to a certain record [22], [34].
It was proven [34] that a Bloom filter should ideally have
half of its bits set to 1 (i.e. 50% filled) to achieve the lowest
possible false positive probability for given values of Q, l
and k. Equations 5 and 6 in fact lead to a probability that
a bit in a Bloom filter is set to 1 as p = e−kQ/l = 0.5 [34].
For PPRL this is important, because the bit patterns and
their frequencies in a set of Bloom filters can be exploited
by a cryptanalysis attack [25]. Such an attack exploits the
fact that Bloom filters that are almost empty can provide
information about rare q-grams and thus rare QID values.
In our experimental evaluation we will set the Bloom fil-
ter parameters for our approach according to the discussion
presented here and following earlier Bloom filter work in
PPRL [22], [23], [24].
5 EXPERIMENTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we empirically evaluate the performance
of our multi-party approximate matching protocol (which
we refer as ‘MPAM’) in terms of the three properties of
PPRL, which are scalability (complexity), linkage quality,
and privacy. We use Lai et al. [13]’s exact matching PPRL
approach (referred as ‘Lai’) as a baseline to compare with
our solution, as other existing multi-party PPRL solutions
require data types of categorical only and / or they are
based on computationally expensive SMC-based privacy
techniques (as reviewed in Section 2).
We implemented both our proposed approach and the
baseline approach in Python 2.7.3, and ran all experiments
on a server with four 6-core 64-bit Intel Xeon 2.4 GHz CPUs,
128 GBytes of memory and running Ubuntu 14.04. The
programs and test datasets are available from the authors.
Following the discussion in Section 4.3 and other work in
PPRL [1], [22], [23], [24], we set the parameters as l = 500,
k = 20, q = 2, st = 0.8, and P = [3, 5, 7]. We apply a
Soundex-based phonetic blocking [3] for the private block-
ing step in the PPRL pipeline (step 1 in Fig. 1), which results
in a set of blocks on which we individually conduct private
comparison and classification (step 2 in Fig. 1) using our
approximate matching linkage protocol.
5.1 Datasets
To provide a realistic evaluation of our approach, we
based all our experiments on a large real-world database,
the North Carolina Voter Registration (NCVR) database
as available from ftp://alt.ncsbe.gov/data/. This database
has been used for the evaluation of various other PPRL
approaches [17], [23], [27], [35]. We have downloaded this
database every second month since October 2011 and built
a combined temporal dataset that contains over 8 million
records of voters’ names and addresses [18]. We are not
aware of any available real-world dataset that contains
records from more than two parties that would allow us to
evaluate our multi-party approach. We therefore generated,
based on the real NCVR database, a series of sub-sets for
multiple parties, as will be described next.
To allow the evaluation of our approach with different
number of parties, with different dataset sizes, and with
data of different quality, we used and modified a recently
proposed data corruptor [36] to generate various datasets
with different characteristics based on randomly selected
records (with given name, surname, suburb name, and post-
code attributes as QIDs) from the NCVR database. During
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the corruption process we kept the identifiers of the selected
and modified records, which allows us to identify true and
false matches and therefore evaluate linkage quality of our
protocol.
Specifically, we extracted sub-sets of 5, 000, 10, 000,
50, 000, 100, 000, 500, 000, and 1, 000, 000 records to gen-
erate datasets for 3, 5, and 7 parties, where the number
of matching records is set to 50% (i.e. half of all selected
records occur in the datasets of all parties). We then applied
various corruption functions in different numbers (ranging
from 1 to 3) on randomly selected attribute values which
allows us to investigate how our approximate matching
approach can deal with ‘dirty’ data. We applied various
corruption functions, including character edit operations
(insertions, deletions, substitutions, and transpositions), and
optical character recognition and phonetic modifications
based on look-up tables and corruption rules [36].
We created several series of datasets for each of the
datasets generated above, where we included a varying
number of corrupted records into the sets of overlapping
records (0%, 20%, and 40%). This means that a certain
percentage of records in the overlap were modified for
randomly selected parties, while the original values were
kept for the other parties. Therefore, some of these records
are exact duplicates across some parties in a set, but are only
approximately matching duplicates across the other parties
in the set. This simulates, for example, the situation where
three out of five hospitals have the correct and complete
contact details (like name and address) of a certain patient,
while in the fourth and fifth hospitals some of the details of
the same patient are different.
5.2 Evaluation Measures
We evaluate the three properties of PPRL for our multi-party
approach using the following evaluation measures:
The scalability of our protocol is measured by runtime
andmemory size required for the linkage. Similar to the reduc-
tion ratio (RR) measure that has been used for measuring the
efficiency of blocking approaches [3], the efficiency of our
filtering approach (referred as ‘MPAM-F’) can be measured
(RRf ) as follows:
RR = 1.0−
|candidate sets after blocking|
|all record sets|
RRf = 1.0−
|candidate sets after filtering|
|candidate sets before filtering|
(7)
The quality of the achieved linkage is measured using
the standard F -measure (F1) that is widely used in in-
formation retrieval and data mining [3]. F -measure is the
harmonic mean of precision and recall, calculated as [3],
[27]:
F1 = 2×
(precision× recall)
(precision+ recall)
, (8)
where precision is the fraction of record pairs classified as
matches by a decision model that are true matches and
recall is the fraction of true matches that are correctly
classified as matches by a decision model.
In line with other work in PPRL [17], [27], [35], we
evaluate privacy using disclosure risk (DR) measures based
on the probability of suspicion (ps), i.e. the likelihood a
masked database record in DM can be matched with one
or several (masked) record(s) in a publicly available global
database G. The probability of suspicion for a masked
value/record rM , ps(r
M ), is calculated as 1/ng where ng
is the number of possible matches in GM to the masked
value rM . We conduct a frequency linkage attack [27] on
our protocol using equivalent datasets as used in the linkage
D to be the global databases (i.e. G ≡ D in the worst
case, because when G ≡ D there will be one-to-one exact
matching of global value for each value in D) by mapping
the revealed bit patterns (segments) in the Bloom filters in
D
M to the Bloom filters in GM in order to calculate the
following disclosure risk measures, as proposed by Vatsalan
et al. [27].
• Mean disclosure risk (DRMean): This takes into con-
sideration the distribution of probability of suspicion
of all values in DM and is calculated as the average
risk (
∑
(ps)/|D
M |) of any sensitive value being re-
identified.
• Marketer disclosure risk (DRMark): This is calculated
as the proportion of masked records (Bloom filter
segments) in DM that match to exactly one masked
record in GM (|{rM ∈ DM : ps(r
M ) = 1.0}|/|DM |).
5.3 Experimental Results
Figs. 11 (a) and 11(b) show the scalability of our approach,
measured by runtime and memory size required for the
linkage as averaged over all parties, and the number of
candidate record sets to be compared and classified for the
linkage. Runtime slightly increases with larger number of
parties (P ) and is almost linear in the size of the datasets.
Interestingly, memory size decreases with P because the
Bloom filter segments at each party become shorter (l/P )
and the similarity calculations are distributed among the
parties. However, memory size increases on the larger
datasets with larger P , because the number of record sets
becomes large with more parties even with the phonetic
blocking [3] and our filtering approach (as described in
Section 3.3) employed.
The reduction ratio of record set comparisons (RRf ) by
our filtering approach is shown in Fig. 11 (b). The RRf
is not significant on smaller datasets. However, it achieves
a moderate RRf in the number of comparisons on larger
datasets and it increases with the number of parties, P .
This opens up a research direction of developing advanced
filtering and blocking/indexing approaches, and efficient
communication patterns for multi-party PPRL techniques to
be studied further.
Compared to the baseline approach by Lai et al. [13], our
approach is more scalable and efficient in terms of linkage
time andmemory size, and is linear in the number of parties,
as shown in Fig. 12 (a). The reason is that in the baseline
approach by Lai et al., after the Bloom filter segments are
distributively processed by the parties to compute the seg-
ments with common 1-bits (conjuncted), each party has to
perform a membership test of its own Bloom filters with the
conjuncted Bloom filters in order to classify them as matches
or non-matches [13]. However, in our proposed approach
only one party (or alternatively an external party) calculates
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Fig. 11. (a) Total time and memory size required for linkage (by one party, averaged over all parties), (b) the number of candidate record sets that
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Fig. 12. Comparison of (a) runtime and memory size required, (b) F-measure achieved, and (c) disclosure risk measures [27] of privacy, with our
proposed approach (MPAM), combined with filtering approach (MPAM-F), and Lai et al.’s approach [13] (Lai), on the NC-10,000 datasets with all
variations for different number of parties.
the similarities of record sets based on the sums of the
number of 1-bits and common 1-bits of all parties, which are
then distributed to all parties. An interesting aspect is that
the time required by our approach slightly increases and
memory size decreases with more parties (increasing P ),
while they increase significantly with the baseline approach.
The quality of linkage, as measured using the F-measure
(F1), achieved with our approach (both MPAM and MPAM-
F) and the baseline approach (Lai) is compared in Fig. 12
(b) on the NCVR-10,000 datasets. As can be seen from
the figure, F1 is high on the non-modified datasets (0%
corruption). On the modified datasets (with 20% and 40%
corruption) F1 drops quite drastically with the number of
parties. The reason is that when records with modifications
occur in each dataset the number of missed true matching
record sets increases. The filtering approach (MPAM-F) only
affects the quality of the linkage slightly, as we achieved
similar results to MPAM. On the non-modified datasets
the filtering approach performs comparatively well. This is
because the precision improves by removing false matching
sets, and thus leads to higher F1 results. Though the baseline
approach performs well on the non-modified datasets, F1 is
significantly lower on the modified datasets (as the baseline
approach by Lai et al. supports only exact matching).
Finally, the privacy of our protocol (as well as Lai et al.’s
approach [13]), as measured by DR measures [27] (mean
disclosure risk andmarketer disclosure risk), for a frequency
linkage attack on Bloom filter segments in the NCVR-10,000
datasets to the known values in the global database G (in
the worst case setting of G ≡ NCVR-10,000) for different
number of parties is shown in Fig. 12 (c). As discussed in
Section 4.2, disclosure risk decreases (i.e. privacy increases)
with an increasing number of parties P as the Bloom filter
segments (l/P ) become shorter and are therefore matched
to a larger number of global records (i.e. ng increases).
This results in lower probability of suspicion of segments
(ps = 1/ng) with larger ng and provides lower values for
the disclosure risk measures [27].
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented an efficient and approximate private
comparison and classification protocol for multi-party PPRL
based on Bloom filter encoding and distributed secure sum-
mation. Our protocol efficiently identifies sets of records
that have a high Dice coefficient similarity across all the
parties. The protocol has a communication complexity that
is linear in the number of parties and the size of the
databases that are linked, making the protocol scalable to
applications where data from multiple parties need to be
linked. However, a main bottleneck of multi-party PPRL is
the large number of candidate record sets.
In future work, we plan to improve the scalability of
our protocol by reducing the number of candidate record
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sets further using improved and advanced private blocking
or filtering approaches, and by investigating different com-
munication patterns. A second avenue of future work will
be to conduct linkage attacks on the protocol with different
Bloom filter encoding methods and different noise addition
techniques to further evaluate the privacy of our approach.
In terms of linkage quality, we also plan to investigate
how to make our protocol more general and allow for
different approximate string similarity functions [3] to be
incorporated. Developing PPRL techniques for identifying
matching record sets across sub-sets of multiple databases
is another important research direction. Finally, we plan
to investigate improved classification techniques for multi-
party PPRL including relational clustering and graph-based
approaches [3] which are successfully used in non-PPRL
applications.
Our ultimate aim is to develop techniques that allow for
large databases to be linked in secure, accurate, automatic,
and scalable ways across many parties, thereby facilitating
novel ways of data analysis and mining that currently are
not feasible due to privacy and confidentiality concerns.
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